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On 18 March 2014, student protesters stormed Taiwan’s LegislativeYuan, kicking off to a 24-day sit-in that paralysed the island’s leg-islature. The historic occupation, later given the name Sunflower
Student Movement (taiyanghua xueyun 太陽花學運), was a protest against
the attempt by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) to pass a service trade pact
with China. The pact, entitled the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
(CSSTA), (1) was signed between China and Taiwan in June 2013 as one of
two follow-up treaties to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA) signed in 2010. (2) As a component of ECFA, CSSTA vows to substan-
tially liberalise trade in services between the two economies. Up to 80 Chi-
nese industries and 64 Taiwanese industries will be opened up under the
pending agreement. 
Apart from the extraordinary vibrancy of Taiwan’s civil society partici-
pation, another distinctive feature of the Sunflower Student Movement
was the constant reference to Hong Kong in the protest rhetoric. The
service trade pact in question, together with its parent treaty ECFA, was
widely thought to be a replica of the free trade agreement signed be-
tween Hong Kong and China in June 2003, named the Mainland and
Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), and framed
at that time as a “generous gift” from Beijing to pull Hong Kong out of
its economic low-tide brought by the SARS epidemic. (3) While CEPA, after
over a decade of implementation, has significantly increased cross-border
economic cooperation as intended and, perhaps more arguably, has
achieved considerable economic results as claimed by the government
and some mainland scholars, (4) it has certainly made the Hong Kong
economy more dependent on China and, more crucially, has created an
open platform for China’s United Front strategy to co-opt local economic
elites. ECFA was thus seen by observers as an agreement broadly mod-
elled upon Hong Kong’s CEPA, as both of them contain the objective of
increasing cross-strait economic integration (5) – just as it is often pointed
out that Hong Kong’s “One Country Two Systems” was originally devised
by Deng Xiaoping as a formula ultimately aimed at the reunification of
Taiwan with China. (6) Chinese officials even explicitly proposed the con-
cept of a “Greater China Economic Circle” (dazhonghua jingji quan 大中
華經濟圈) through which economic cooperation between Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and China can be fostered through ECFA and CEPA. (7) Both pacts,
as clearly stated, aim to normalise and facilitate inter-and-cross-territory
trade relations in goods, services, and investment. Less explicitly revealed,
however, is the parallel objective, which has been pointed out by ob-
servers in Hong Kong and Taiwan, to induce political integration through
closer economic partnership with China. 
With the lessons of CEPA in mind, opinion in Taiwan was divided over the
service trade pact. Supporters, including the KMT government led by Pres-
ident Ma Ying-jeou, argued that the pact would be economically beneficial
to Taiwan while diplomatically indispensable for Taiwan to join other free
trade zones such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). (8) Opponents argued that
the pact lacked a democratic mandate and condemned the negotiation
process between the CCP and KMT governments as a “black box” (heixiang
黑箱). Meanwhile, quoting a government report estimating that the trade
pact would only boost GDP by 0.03%, (9) they argued that the economic
benefits were not as clear as supporters claimed. Instead, they worried that
opening Taiwan’s service industry to Chinese companies would harm local
small-business owners and create only low-skill service jobs, pointing to
Hong Kong’s widening poverty gap after the implementation of CEPA. (10)
Beneath these reservations, however, lies a deeper existential concern. Pro-
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testers fear that the service trade pact will make the de facto independent
Taiwan vulnerable to more direct forms of political intervention from Beijing,
a constant threat that has pervaded Taiwanese society since the KMT re-
treated to the island in 1949. (11) Meanwhile, Taiwan’s service trade pact de-
bate aroused anxiety among people in Hong Kong over the decade-long
but little scrutinised CEPA. Observers are starting to be aware of the fact
that CEPA could be a United Front tool that has progressively undermined
the cherished “One Country Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一 國 兩 制 )
arrangement.
This article puts Hong Kong and Taiwan in comparative perspective, with
the aim of examining the effect of China’s growing centripetal political in-
fluence on both territories. Despite considerable differences in their social
and political history, Hong Kong and Taiwan have become increasingly similar
over the past decade both in the way China seeks to exert political power
on their domestic politics through playing the economic card, and in the way
resistance against China’s looming advance is shaped. This article reviews
the arguments that compare the two territories. The first section looks at
how both Taiwan’s CSSTA/ECFA and Hong Kong’s CEPA serve as tools of
China’s economic united front strategies. The second section highlights the
convergence of Beijing’s attitude towards Hong Kong and Taiwan as sug-
gested by recent policy announcement. The third focuses on the political
repercussions and how civil societies in both territories respond to Beijing’s
advances. As a result of China’s converging policies towards the two territo-
ries, we are seeing more frequent exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan
in recent years, and can expect to see more collaboration in the near future.
Political integration through economic
dependence
Long insisting that Taiwan is an integral part of its territory, China has con-
stantly attempted to exert influence on Taiwan politics to deter Taiwanese
independence. During Taiwan’s authoritarian era and the early years of de-
mocratisation, the perceived threat from China was sustained by the active
threat of armed invasion. However, with China’s “peaceful rise,” Beijing’s
policy towards Taiwan gradually shifted from the reliance on military threat
to paving conditions for “peaceful reunification” (heping tongyi 和平統一)
through closer economic partnership. Starting in 2005, when Taiwan was
still ruled by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
China’s former president Hu Jintao increased contact with its erstwhile arch-
enemy, the KMT, beginning with the historic meeting between Hu and then-
KMT Chairman Lien Chan in April 2005. The meeting took place at a curious
time because it was only a month after the ratification of China’s Anti-Se-
cession Law, which formalised “non-peaceful means” as an option of re-
sponse to Taiwan’s declaration of independence. (12) With the KMT winning
the presidential election together with a legislative majority in 2008, Hu Jin-
tao immediately adopted a softer approach towards Taiwan. In his six pro-
posals for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, Hu stressed
“enhancing political mutual trust” under the “one-China principle,” and
vowed to advance economic cooperation between the two sides, hoping
that the “normalisation of cross-straits economic relations” will “lay a more
solid material foundation […] for the peaceful development of cross-straits
relations.” (13) Since then, cross-straits economic ties have steadily increased
with the establishment of the three direct links of mail, transport, and busi-
ness and the significant growth witnessed in Taiwan’s trade volume and in-
vestment in relation to China. China is now Taiwan’s biggest trading partner,
representing more than 21% of total trade (40% including Hong Kong),
tripling the figure for 2002. (14) Political contact also became more frequent.
The Hu-Lien meeting in 2005 initiated the KMT-CCP Forum that hosted
frequent party-to-party dialogues, and which, with the election of President
Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, were transformed into semi-official government ex-
changes, leading to specific policies and agreements – most notably the
ECFA and CSSTA. The softening of Beijing’s approach towards the KMT was
soon interpreted by the DPP camp and pro-independence commentators
as the use of an economic United Front strategy to induce reunification
with Taiwan. Most notably, Lin Chong-pin, former deputy defence minister
of Taiwan, commented that Beijing had come to the realisation that it would
be “cheaper to buy Taiwan than to attack Taiwan.” (15)
How the KMT-CCP cooperation eroded Taiwan’s democracy has been force-
fully presented by André Beckershoff in a recent academic publication, (16)
which also clearly described the political context for the recent protests
against CSSTA. The article shows how the shift in cross-straits policy-making
from a government to a party framework has brought about the formation
of a powerful interest group bringing together KMT legislators, cabinet min-
isters, and business elites, who cannot be held accountable by democratic
procedures. Consequently, one of the biggest anxieties towards signing the
service trade pact is that the pact would facilitate China’s United Front strat-
egy and impact Taiwan’s internal politics and national security. Seeing Bei-
jing’s persistent effort to co-opt Taiwanese elites, protesters fear that the
service trade pact under ECFA will become an institutional platform to le-
gitimate and normalise such ties. As Wu Jieh-min, a Taiwanese China scholar,
observes, the CCP has been trying to build rapport with Taiwanese pro-uni-
fication politicians as well as business elites who have set up operations in
China, forming networks that he called “cross-straits business and political
alliances” (kua haixia zhengshang lianmeng 跨海峽政商聯盟), which act as
a pivot for Beijing to leverage power in Taiwan’s political terrain. (17) Such net-
works, as explained by Wu, comprise big business conglomerates that have
operational bases in both Taiwan and China, such as the Want Want Group,
Ting Hsin Group, and Foxconn, which have great influence in Taiwan’s political
and business circles as well as on society. For example, the Want Want Group,
after its massive expansion in China, returned to Taiwan and acquired the
China Times Group in 2008, which included the island’s influential newspaper
China Times, China Television, Chung T’ien Television, and the Broadcasting
Corporation of China. In 2011, it went on to acquire 60% of the second
largest cable television services, previously owned by China Network Sys-
70 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 4 / 2
11. Richard Chiou-yuan Lu, “China, We Fear You,” Foreign Policy, 21 March 2014, available at www.for-
eignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/21/china_we_fear_you_taiwan_trade_pact_essay (accessed on
22 April 2014).
12. The full text of China’s anti-secession law is available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html (English) and http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/
2005-03/14/content_2694168.htm (Chinese).
13. Hu Jintao, “Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations
and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” Speech at
the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,
31 December 2008, available at www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/t20110
322_1794707.htm (accessed on 29 April 2014).
14. Joshua Meltzer, “Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and the Importance of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Brookings East Asia Policy Paper Series, January 2014. 
15. “Sore points: How Taiwan and North Korea complicate the Sino-American relationship,” Econo-
mist, 22 October 2009. 
16. André Beckershoff, “The KMT–CCP Forum: Securing Consent for Cross-Strait Rapprochement,”
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2014, pp. 213-241.
17. “Interview: China influencing Taiwan via firms,” Taipei Times, 26 January 2014, available at
www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/01/26/2003582181 (accessed on 22 April
2014).
Current affairs
tems. These acquisitions made the group the biggest media firm in Taiwan,
enabling it to influence public opinion – and, according to Wu, also to “ad-
vocate Chinese nationalism” and “toe the same line as China’s state-owned
media.” (18) In 2012, more than one hundred Taiwanese business leaders, in-
cluding heads of these conglomerates, pledged support for the “1992 Con-
sensus” (jiu’er gongshi 九二共識), which has been emphasised by Beijing as
the “one China” principle, by placing ads in Taiwan’s newspapers. However, it
should be noted that the “1992 Consensus” (“One China, different interpre-
tations”) does not exist as such, as the CCP does not acknowledge the second
part of the statement, while the KMT does not accept the first part without
the second. Under Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP, which does not recognise the “1992
Consensus,” advocated a new “Taiwan Consensus.”
Another worry among protesters is that the trade pact will open the gate
for the direct entry of Chinese capital. Opponents argue that this might harm
the local economy, pose a threat to national security, and change Taiwan’s
way of life rather than making Taiwanese firms go global as claimed. As Wu
notes, the promise of the trade pact to “globalise” Taiwan’s economy is only
a pretext to limit commercial activities to trade across the Taiwan Strait as
opposed to opening up to the world, as business activities of Taiwanese
“transnational corporations” only cover China and Taiwan. (19) Worse, as Tai-
wanese China expert Hsu Szu-chien suggested, the pact might even induce
China to gradually bring state-owned enterprises to operate in Taiwan. Hsu
predicted that these firms can first start small, and then quietly expand to
monopolise Taiwanese industries with the backup of massive Chinese funds,
so as to act as “tools of political dominance” in the long run. (20) Some worry
that the pact will open up Taiwan’s strategic industries to Chinese companies,
thus harming Taiwan’s national interests. Rex How, a former advisor to Presi-
dent Ma and a veteran of Taiwan’s publishing industry, pointed out that open-
ing up the publishing industry, for instance, will enable Beijing to enter this
strategic business and spread propaganda that serves its interests. (21) Others
worry that trading with China will fundamentally change the Taiwanese way
of life. Liu Shao-hua, an anthropologist at the Academia Sinica, puts forward
such a viewpoint in her widely circulated article. She argues that the values
that stand behind the incoming Chinese capital – including party-state hege-
mony, monopoly of big Chinese firms, government suppression against civic
freedom, and the lack of respect for human dignity – constitute a palpable
threat to Taiwanese values, which are centred on individual freedom. (22)
Parallels with China’s economic integration strategy can in fact be more
explicitly found in the context of Hong Kong under the implementation of
CEPA. While opponents of the Taiwanese service trade pact have pointed to
the widening of poverty gap in Hong Kong over the past decade, these ref-
erences have overlooked the equally significant aspect of CEPA regarding
economic dependence. Official statistics in Hong Kong have shown the rising
dependence of the economy on China. Over the past decade, Hong Kong’s
trade volume with China has increased three-fold (Graph 1), and is steadily
growing as a percentage of its total trade (Graph 2). Inward direct investment
from China and outward direct investment to China, compared with other
countries, have also risen significantly in terms of proportion. Meanwhile,
under the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) as part of CEPA, Hong Kong has wit-
nessed a rapid increase in Chinese tourists visiting the territory (Graph 3).
The number of Chinese tourists as a percentage of total incoming visitors
rose steadily, reaching 75% in 2013 (Graph 3). In a recent government report
assessing Hong Kong’s capacity to receive tourists, it was estimated that an-
nual tourists to Hong Kong could further rise to 70 million in 2017 and 100
million in 2023, with the majority of them expected to be from China. (23) In
short, as academic Sonny Lo noted, “Hong Kong has transformed from ‘a
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core’ shaping the development of peripheral China into a region more de-
pendence on the mainland’s economic support than ever before.” (24)
In recent years, closer economic partnership between China and Hong
Kong has proceeded toward active takeover of Hong Kong companies by
Chinese companies. In January 2014, State Grid Corporation of China, the
largest state-owned electric utility, purchased an 18% stake in Hong Kong
Electric and became the second largest shareholder in this sole electricity
provider on Hong Kong Island. This seems to be consistent with the sug-
gestion of Li Jinying, manager of the state-owned China Resources Power,
to the Hong Kong Chief Executive Office during his visit with a business
delegation in 2013. Li recommended that the Hong Kong government re-
sume control over the two electric companies, CLP Power and Hong Kong
Electric, and hand them over to Chinese companies. (25) Another manager,
Tan Xinjian, even urged Chinese companies to simply buy out the two elec-
tric giants. (26)
While the standalone effect of CEPA on Hong Kong’s increased depend-
ence on China might be difficult to quantify, and while researchers have
begun to question the often claimed economic benefits, (27) what is more
certain is that the dependence that CEPA induces has provided an open
platform for the CCP to carry out united front work in Hong Kong, which
allows Beijing to co-opt elites to advance its political interests – a dynamic
that fuelled the worries of Taiwanese protesters. While the CCP’s united front
work has a long history in Hong Kong, it has mostly been kept secretive and
underground. (28) Even after China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong in
1997, Beijing’s political intervention remained discreet, as “One Country
Two Systems” has barred Beijing from openly intervening in Hong Kong’s
internal affairs. The introduction of CEPA, however, provides an open and
legitimate platform for united front work. As Ke Dai, an official at the United
Front Department of Guangzhou’s Sun Yat-sen University, wrote, “CEPA al-
lows China to use economics as an axis to strengthen political communi-
cation between both sides and speed up the return of Hong Kong people’s
hearts (renxin huigui人心回歸).” (29)
To promote political ties, Ke urged the United Front Department to
strengthen communication with professionals, trade associations, chambers
of commerce, and NGOs in Hong Kong. In fact, the suggestion to increase
mainland-Hong Kong business ties under CEPA has already become a regular
practice. Over the past decade, Hong Kong business groups have made fre-
quent visits to Chinese cities at the invitation of local governments and the
United Front Work Department. (30) Reciprocal visits by Chinese political and
business groups have also been frequent and often involve high-level party
officials. Most notably, Chinese President Xi Jinping led a delegation of over
650 government officials and businessmen to Hong Kong in January 2005
while serving as the Party secretary of Zhejiang. (31) The event, named “Zhe-
jiang Week,” reached an agreement on 153 Zhejiang-Hong Kong projects
under CEPA totalling USD2.4 billion. (32)
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Examples such as these are plentiful but await more systematic docu-
mentation. More recently, however, scholars have started to research China’s
latest united front strategies in Hong Kong. Brian C. Fong, for example, la-
belled the strategies as “the partnership between the Chinese government
and Hong Kong’s capitalist class.” He observes that Hong Kong business
elites have been increasingly over-represented among the Hong Kong del-
egations to the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference. He argues that excessive representation allows
them to establish direct and institutionalised access to the sovereign state.
This kind of circumvention, according to Fong, has “undermined the relative
autonomy of the post-colonial state and resulted in growing cleavages
within the state-business alliance.” (33) The formation of such an interest
group also shows striking similarities to the effects of the KMT-CCP forum
in Taiwan. 
Despite the practice of keeping motives discreet, China’s use of economic
integration to exert political influence in both Hong Kong and Taiwan has
been “leaked” by Chinese state media. Global Times, a hawkish CCP mouth-
piece, published a translated article in February 2014, entitled “Beijing’s
Strategy to ‘buy’ Taiwan: Coerced Unification Without Firing a Shot,” (34)
which was originally written by Parris Chang, a US-based Taiwanese scholar,
on the World Tribune. (35) Chang’s critical undertone against Beijing’s political
advance on Taiwan contrasted bizarrely with Global Times’ decision to trans-
late the article into Chinese. The article argues that Beijing seeks to advance
cross-strait integration through the service trade agreement. “From Beijing’s
perspective,” it argues, “this agreement is intended also to perform vital po-
litical and united front functions in Taiwan.” It then adds the comparison
between Hong Kong and Taiwan:  
“As shown by the experience of Hong Kong, the agreement will pro-
vide legal cover for China’s agents to live and work throughout Taiwan.
Through Chinese enterprises and shops, China’s operatives would con-
tinue to build up its resources, and strengthen its capability to influence
and shape Taiwan’s political process and policy efforts toward peaceful
unification without firing a shot.” (36)
It is unclear whether the Global Times published this article (despite its
critical tone) because it naively endorses the strategy denounced by Chang,
but at the very least, we may surmise that such a strategy is being increas-
ingly discussed in Beijing. 
China’s new attitude towards Hong Kong
and Taiwan?
Although the appearance of a single article in the Global Times does not
necessarily reflect Beijing’s official position, a much more authoritative
source may have testified to China’s new attitude towards Hong Kong and
Taiwan. In Premier Li Keqiang’s first annual work report delivered to the Na-
tional People’s Congress in March 2014, there were significant changes in
the sections regarding Hong Kong and Taiwan. (37) Compared to the reports
delivered in previous years, the two sections were almost tripled in length,
and the wording Premier Li used was different from that chosen by former
Premier Wen Jiabao. When speaking about Hong Kong, the default state-
ment of “the people of Hong Kong governing Hong Kong” (Gang ren zhi
Gang 港人治港) and “high degree of autonomy” (gaodu zizhi 高度自治)
were removed for the first time in ten years. (38) Only “One Country Two
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Systems” was kept in the section, with an added emphasis on “fully and cor-
rectly implement the Basic Law” (quanmian zhunque luoshi jibenfa 全面準
確落實基本法). The statement then urged “further increasing cooperation
between the mainland and both Hong Kong and Macau” so as to “enhance
their competitiveness,” adding that both regions will benefit as the mainland
deepens reform comprehensively and modernises.  
In the section about Taiwan, the differences are even more striking. Beijing
will now “fully implement” (quanmian guanche 全面貫徹), as opposed to
merely “adhering to” (jianchi 堅持), the major policies concerning Taiwan
affairs. Moreover, what used to be a generic description of these policies is
now substantiated by a number of principles. This includes upholding the
1992 Consensus under the one-China framework, strengthening cross-
straits political trust, promoting economic integration, exchanges and co-
operation, and engaging in consultations and negotiations. The underlying
principle is now made explicitly poignant. Grounded on the vision that “peo-
ple on both sides of the straits are one family” (liangan yijia qin 兩岸一家
親), China will “uphold our kindred friendship and work together with our
compatriots to build the beautiful homeland of the Chinese nation and
achieve China’s peaceful reunification.” This direction, it concluded, will be-
come an “irresistible and irreversible trend in history.”
While the strategy itself was nothing new, as has been evident under the
CCP’s increasing contact with the KMT in the Hu Jintao era and gradual in-
clusion of Hong Kong into China’s economic development over the past
years, the substantial revision of such a high-level policy blueprint reflects
the rationalisation of the CCP’s strategies towards both regions under the
new administration of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Although the differences
between the respective sections on Hong Kong and Taiwan are meant to
acknowledge their distinct political relationships with China, they are nev-
ertheless strikingly coherent in their emphasis on fostering political ties
through economic exchange, cooperation, and integration. Beijing’s ultimate
objective of bringing about reunification appeared even more tangible dur-
ing a meeting between President Xi Jinping and Lien Chan in February 2014,
in which Xi introduced his “three-stage formula” for enhancing cross-strait
ties. According to the formula, cross-strait communication will now move
from the first stage, which focuses on economic and non-political ex-
changes, to the second stage, which develops official contacts or meetings
between the two sides’ government heads, proceeding finally to full cross-
straits political talks on an “equal basis” to discuss “peaceful reunifica-
tion.” (39) Seen in this light, just as economic integration in Hong Kong has
helped to strengthen China’s political control over the territory, economic
integration in Taiwan serves as a basis for promoting institutionalised polit-
ical discussions between the CCP and KMT. Both Hong Kong’s CEPA and Tai-
wan’s ECFA (together with CSSTA) can thus be seen as tools to advance
Beijing’s policies. The dormant model of “One Country Two Systems,” which
was said to be a formula devised for reunifying Taiwan based on the promise
of political autonomy, seems to be quietly revived through the promotion
of economic integration.
Political resistances against China in Taiwan
and Hong Kong
The acceleration of China’s political advance in Taiwan and Hong Kong
has led to worrying repercussions in both societies, which are especially no-
ticeable in the media realm. According to the World Press Freedom Index
2014 released by Reporters without Borders, Taiwan’s ranking fell three
notches from a year earlier to 50th place. The report mentioned “pro-Beijing
Want Want group’s acquisition of the China Times” as a threat to Taiwan’s
media freedom, referring to “China’s growing economic weight” as an en-
abler to extend influence over the media in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan,
“which had been largely spared political censorship until recently.” (40) Similar
press censorship, probably even more blatant, has been taking place in Hong
Kong. The same index showed that Hong Kong’s ranking has tumbled from
18th in 2002 to 61st in 2013. A Wall Street Journal report released in February
2014, which highlighted the simultaneous erosion of press freedom in Tai-
wan and Hong Kong, quoted another recent report by the Committee to
Protect Journalists that focused on Hong Kong’s increasing trend toward
self-censorship as well as frequent attacks targeting journalists and outspo-
ken media outlets. (41) Not long after the report was released, Kevin Lau, the
former chief editor of the influential and critical newspaper Ming Pao, was
violently attacked by two hit men. While the motive remains unclear, the
attack was widely suspected to have connections with the newspaper’s col-
laboration with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
(ICIJ) on a project about offshore money leaks, in which connections to fam-
ilies of high Chinese officials have been uncovered. (42)
In Taiwan, worries over Beijing’s ulterior motives have loomed over society
for the past few years, triggering protests such as the anti-media monopoly
movement in 2012, in which people protested against an attempt by the
pro-China Want Want China Times Media Group to expand its media em-
pire. (43) Although protesters failed to stop its forceful acquisition of the China
Network Systems, the pressure did contribute to preventing Want Want
from acquiring Taiwan’s Apple Daily, a critical newspaper held by Hong Kong
media tycoon Jimmy Lai. (44) Meanwhile, sporadic protests against signing
the ECFA with China have fermented since 2010. At that time, protesters
already worried that the framework agreement would increase China’s in-
fluence over Taiwan, and would be “tantamount to a first step toward uni-
fication” – a concern especially amplified as Taiwan approached the 2012
presidential election. (45) The Sunflower Student Movement that erupted in
March 2014 can thus be seen as the culmination of periodic protests over
the past several years. 
Apart from being much larger in scale, what distinguishes the movement
from previous protests, as media commentator Chang Tieh-chih pointed
out, is that it brought the China factor out into the public limelight for wider
discussion. (46) Previously, although awareness of the China factor has long
existed in Taiwan, it was largely circumscribed and did not gain traction in
the broader Taiwanese society, most likely due to the tense polarisation be-
tween advocates of unification and independence. During the Sunflower
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Movement, one distinctive feature was the vibrant discussions and circula-
tion of articles that drew attention to the China factor. As opposed to re-
jecting China outright, authors typically spoke of the necessity to engage
with China apart from being aware of its influence. For example, in Liu Shao-
hua’s piece, despite warning against the potential value clash brought by
China, she said, “We don’t need to demonise China…and we cannot refuse
to engage with China because China is our neighbour.” (47) For these authors,
the unification/independence dichotomy is out-dated. Engaging with China
is neither to utterly reject nor to unreservedly embrace by giving up Tai-
wanese identity. It is rather to understand the mechanism through which
China influences Taiwan, to discuss the extent and the boundary of future
engagement, and to deliberate upon the institutional arrangement of cross-
straits interaction. That was why protesters insisted that they were not
against the service trade pact in principle, and even admitted that some
form of engagement with China is inevitable. What they demanded was an
oversight mechanism that could monitor future cross-straits negotiation,
and only after that could the service trade pact return to the legislating
agenda. Ma’s promise to implement such a mechanism, and thus to bring
the entire Cross-Straits dynamics back under democratic control, undeniably
represents a significant achievement of the Sunflower Movement. 
This acknowledgement of China, according to J. Michael Cole, also signifies
the emergence of a new Taiwanese identity that appeals to the majority of
Taiwanese. As he writes, 
It does not oppose trade deals, nor does it reject cultivating good
relations with China. But it has drawn lines with regards to the ways
of life and freedoms of all Taiwanese and sent a clear warning that
anyone who crosses those lines will face a challenge from thousands
of highly educated, connected, and united Taiwanese. (48)
In Hong Kong, looming economic integration with mainland China has
sparked increasing political resistances in recent years. The 2010 protest
against the plan to build a costly express rail link between Guangzhou and
Hong Kong kicked off a public debate about the need to integrate into the
Pearl River Delta regional economic zone. Although the protest failed to
stop the plan, it sparked a wider discussion regarding the drawbacks of closer
economic integration with mainland China. Many began to be aware of the
increasing dependence of the economy on China and its overlooked disad-
vantages. Grassroots NGOs, such as the Local Research Community (bentu
yanjiu she 本土研究社) and the Land Justice League (tudi zhengyi lianmeng
土地正義聯盟), were formed with the objective to study the impact of re-
gional integration and urban redevelopment on the local economy, to pro-
duce local knowledge to resist the government’s grand narrative. (49) More
crucially, these local NGOs have played the role of monitoring the govern-
ment over integration plans – similar to the way Taiwanese protesters de-
manded an oversight mechanism to monitor cross-strait negotiations. For
instance, they drew attention to the one-sided inclusion of Hong Kong into
China’s state planning, namely the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) and
Outline of the Program for Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta
(2008-2020), in the absence of domestic democratic consent, and protested
against the remaking of the New Territories to support the development of
Qianhai, a district in Shenzhen, into a new retail hub. (50)
Others emphasise the need to preserve the local identity and way of life
under economic integration with China, taking issue particularly with the
influx of mainland tourists as a convenient target for resistance. Tensions
began to erupt in early 2012 as a luxury brand allegedly banned locals from
taking photographs outside its flagship store, appearing to favour wealthy
Chinese tourists. Staging regular protests against mainland visitors since
then, angry Hongkongers described them as “locusts” for their perceived
“uncivilised” behaviour and their purchase of local resources such as phar-
maceuticals and baby formula. Combined with the anti-national education
campaign in 2012, these tensions have coalesced into an emerging phe-
nomenon of “de-Sinicisation” (qu Zhongguohua 去中國化) and renewed
discussions about the local identity. (51) One representative view was put
forth by Chin Wan-kan, the author of the award-winning book Hong Kong
as a City-state (XiangGang chengbang lun 香港城邦論). Chin advocated the
autonomy of Hong Kong as a city-state, which is distinguished by unique
and superior features such as its Cantonese-speaking population, traditional
Chinese characters, and its preservation of the Cantonese culture. In order
to protect Hong Kong’s autonomy, people should focus solely on local affairs
and exclude all things mainland Chinese, even the frequent human rights
abuses and June 4th commemoration. Since then, the term “nativists” or
“localists” (bentupai 本土派) has emerged in the local political lexicon to
draw a distinction from those whom Chin denigrates as the “Greater China
sympathisers” (dazhonghua pai 大中華派). (52) To some extent, the emer-
gence of “nativism” in Hong Kong harks back to Taiwan’s democratisation
during the 1980s, where the strengthening and politicisation of local Tai-
wanese identity played a crucial role. Whether such a force will be an im-
petus for democratisation in Hong Kong is something to be closely watched. 
On the other hand, the bifurcated strategies of political resistance in Hong
Kong – one is to monitor and check Chinese influence, the other to utterly
reject China in spite of China’s strong presence – suggest an interesting
comparison with the gradual acceptance of the need to engage with China,
albeit with caution, in Taiwan. Why that is the case, however, also awaits
further inquiry. Another new feature of this resistance against China’s ad-
vance is the growing links between the civil societies of Hong Kong and Tai-
wan. In late 2013, the organisers of Hong Kong’s budding pro-democracy
campaign, Occupy Central (zhanling zhonghuan  佔領中環), travelled to Tai-
wan to give public talks about the electoral reform movement in the hope
of borrowing insights from Taiwan’s social movements. (53) Earlier this year,
a two-day forum bringing together social activists from Taiwan and Hong
Kong was held in Taipei, aiming to explore the possibility of more frequent
civil society collaboration. The opportunity to collaborate soon materialised
through the Sunflower Movement. During the Movement, Taiwanese pro-
testers repeatedly referred to the lesson of Hong Kong under CEPA as ground
to reject signing the CSSTA. Meanwhile, many in Hong Kong voiced support
for the Taiwan protests. A group of Hongkongers placed an advertisement
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in Liberty Times, a Taiwan newspaper, urging Taiwan protesters to learn the
painful lesson of Hong Kong. (54) On March 26, a protest was held by uni-
versity students in Hong Kong to support the Taipei sit-in. (55) In addition,
two public forums were held by civic groups in Hong Kong to discuss the
implications of the Taiwan protests in connection with Hong Kong, one of
which was convened by the Local Research Community as an inauguration
to kick off a research project on CEPA. (56) Perhaps most striking of all, Lin
Feifan, student leader of the Sunflower Movement, was spotted wearing a
black “Occupy Central” T-shirt during the protesters’ retreat from the legis-
lature. Although the fashion choice was likely unintentional, Lin later said
in an interview that he was inspired by the element of deliberative democ-
racy proposed by the Hong Kong movement. (57)
Conclusion 
While Beijing’s strategy of co-opting political and business elites in both
Hong Kong and Taiwan through economic integration is maturing and is
paying off to some extent, political resistance in both territories contin-
ues to develop and has managed to constrain at least some of Beijing’s
advances. In Taiwan, increasingly frustrated at the submissiveness of
politicians and business elites towards China, the younger generation is
demanding more transparency and accountability in the process of cross-
straits negotiations, which they insist should be predicated on the island’s
preservation as an independent political entity. In Hong Kong, local iden-
tity has become a nascent political force. Despite the government agenda
to promote Chinese national identity and patriotism, Hong Kong people
are increasingly identifying themselves as “Hongkongers” rather than
“Chinese.” (58) Fierce resistance against clandestine integration plans, pa-
triotic propaganda, and the influx of mainland tourists only serves to fur-
ther de-Sinicise Hong Kong and strengthen the budding nativist identity.
As links between the civil societies of Taiwan and Hong Kong continue
to develop in parallel, it will not be surprising to see more collective re-
sistance from both territories against the political threat from China in
the near future.
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